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This thesis analyzes the military capabilities of Malaysia, Singapore, and
Indonesia and assesses their collective ability to control the use of the Straits of
Malacca and the Singapore Straits. With steadily growing economies as a source
of funding, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia have made significant
improvements in their military stature. Collectively, they can control this vital
passage, preventing both military and commercial shipping from using these straits.
These three littoral nations' key interests that might lead them to restrict and deny
the use of the Malacca Straits are identified. Their military force composition and
capability also is reviewed.
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This thesis explores the collective ability of Malaysia,
Singapore and Indonesia to control the use of the Straits of
Malacca and Singapore, more commonly referred to as the
Malacca Straits. With burgeoning economies as a source of
funding, these three nations have increased the quantity and
quality of their militaries. In this thesis, I suggest that
they possess the means to control these straits even to the
extent of denying passage to other navies.
If the littoral states opt to restrict passage through
the Malacca Straits, the collective composition and capability
of their militaries would render the prospect of a forced
passage costly in terms of vessels sunk or damaged. The
littoral states possess a large number of Harpoon and Exocet
anti-ship missiles, which are installed on an equally large
number of frigates, corvettes, and patrol craft. They have
also developed extensive air forces. Additionally, the
littoral states possess long-range, mobile artillery with
effective ranges sufficient to engage vessels attempting to
force passage through the Malacca Straits.
While not on par with a larger, more advanced navy, the
littoral states possess sufficient quantities of highly mobile
weapon systems to make forced passage through the Malacca
Straits a cost prohibitive option. The potential costs
associated with vessels lost or damaged while attempting a
forced passage would far outweigh the costs associated with
making a longer transit, both in terms of time and distance,
through the Lombok and Makassar Straits. The option of an
alternate transit corridor, albeit a longer one, significantly
reduces the likelihood that a non-littoral nation would risk
a forced passage through the Malacca Straits. Strategic
planners should consider this observation when planning force
movements involving the Malacca Straits.
The remainder of this chapter will discuss the geographic
characteristics of the Indo-Pacific area and the importance of
this region to the littoral states. Also discussed is the
economic, political, and military significance of the Malacca
Straits with regard to the littoral states. The chapter
concludes with a discussion of the environmental issues
centered on the Malacca Straits and their impact on the
littoral states.
In Chapter II, the history, politico-military background
and policy, foreign economic and military assistance, defense
industry and military structure, alliances, and national
security concerns for each of the littoral states is reviewed.
This information is presented to establish the character of
each country and present the framework for their interest in
the Malacca Straits.
Chapter III presents the force composition, capability,
and analysis of each of the littoral states' militaries. The
information in this chapter supports the argument that the
littoral states possess the military capability to control the
use of the Malacca Straits.
Chapter IV presents three pressing issues for the
littoral states that may serve as catalysts for restricting
the Malacca Straits. These issues are discussed in terms of
their relevance to the littoral states and how they would be
affected. This is followed by conclusions presented in
Chapter V.
The material used to present and support the argument of
this paper was developed by utilizing primary and secondary
sources such as textbooks, periodicals, and news papers. In
some instances, the references utilized are dated. However,
the information presented is relevant to current issues.
Every attempt to present the most current data has been made.
A. THE INDO-PACIFIC AREA
The Indo-Pacific area incorporates six regions. These
are the Southeast, Central South, and Southwest Asia, the
Indian Ocean, Northeast Asia, and Oceania. (Dupuy, 1993,
vol. 3, p. 1252) While this region incorporates more than 93
million square miles, the most significant waterways
connecting all the sub-regions of the area are the Malacca
Straits. Located between Sumatra and the Malayan Peninsula,
the Malacca Straits are the major international navigation
route linking the Pacific Ocean, the South China Sea, and the
Indian Ocean. The Straits vary in width from 10 to 220 miles
and are slightly over 500 miles in length. There are three
stretches of the Straits that are less than 24 miles wide. At
these narrow points, the 12-mile territorial waters claimed by
each of the coastal states of Indonesia and Malaysia overlap
and together cover the entire width of the Straits.
Additionally, there are places in the Malacca channel that run
through the territorial waters of the coastal states, even
when the total width is more than 24 miles. (Vertzberger,
1982, pp. 3-4)
The eastern continuation of the Malacca Straits is
officially recognized as the Straits of Singapore. They serve
as a link to the South China Sea. Situated between the
islands of Indonesia and the southern coast of Malaysian Johor
and the Island of Singapore, the Straits of Singapore serve as
a link to the South China Sea. The length of these particular
straits is 75 miles. They never measure more than 12 miles in
width. Through these straits, the navigable passage zone lies
within the six-mile territorial limit of the littoral states.
The Malacca Straits can be bypassed through the Sunda, Lombok,
Makassar, and Ombai-Wetar Straits. However, these are narrow,
shallow waterways that lie entirely within Indonesian
archipelagic waters. (Vertzberger, 1982, p. 4)
The Malacca Straits are the vital link between the
Pacific and Indian Oceans, providing the means for transport
of vast quantities of food, fuel, and other natural resources
to all sixty nations of Asia. The Straits also serve as a
critically important route to the troublesome Middle East for
the U. S. Seventh Fleet. More important than the distances
between points in the Indo-Pacific area are the total number
of "steaming days" required to transport personnel and
materiel over the constrained routings that may be available
in time of conflict. The amount of time required for ship
movement and resupply efforts are often measured in terms of
weeks, even months, rather than hours or days. The
complexities resulting from regional hostilities will make the
actual time requirements for ship movement or resupply efforts
much greater than what might be calculated by simply reviewing
a navigation chart and determining the most direct routes.
(Dupuy, 1993, vol. 3, p. 1252)
B. ECONOMIC SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MALACCA STRAITS
The Malacca Straits are important to the world's economy.
In 1993, the sea-borne freight traffic loaded for
international distribution from Indonesian ports totaled
142,968,400 metric tons and international goods unloaded in
these ports originating from countries around the world
amounted to 44,958,800 metric tons. Peninsular Malaysia
registered 9, 620 foreign trade vessels entering its ports in
1990 with 57,050,000 registered tons of cargo. Similarly,
Singapore's registered international sea-borne shipping in
1995 totaled 130,224,300 freight tons loaded and 175,259,700
freight tons unloaded. That same year, 104,123 foreign ships
were cleared to enter and exit Singapore's ports. (Europa
Yearbook, 1997, pp. 1649, 2140, 2900) If alternate routes to
the Malacca Straits had to be used, the costs associated with
longer transits and time delays would be significant. This
may present serious problems for the economies of most nations
us'ing the straits as a trade route. The specific amounts of
additional costs would vary depending upon the locations of
the port of origin and the port of destination.
C. POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MALACCA STRAITS
During the last fifty years, the Straits regions'
political entities, have attained political independence.
These newly formed nations have been given title to vast
expanses of ocean resources by Law of the Sea (LOS)
agreements. Interpretation of technical provisions of
treaties and the influence of relationships that existed prior
to gaining independence are the source of potential conflict.
Additional sources of potential conflict are ethnic,
linguistic, and religious differences within and between the
states
.
Various ideologies, the education of present and future
leaders in various "mother" countries, the rise in terrorism,
and revolutionary conflict may raise the level of instability
in the Straits region in the years ahead. This may lead to
calls for politico-military intervention by external powers.
Military forces would be forced to transit a very complex set
of subregions and individual political entities interconnected
by sealanes of communication (SLOCs) in the waters of the
Straits region. (Dupuy, 1993, vol. 3, p. 1253)
The political significance of the Malacca Straits was
made clearer when the foreign ministers of Indonesia, Malaysia
and Singapore met in November 1971 to consider the question of
the status of the Straits and the passage through them. These
talks resulted in a full agreement between Malaysia and
Indonesia, and only a partial agreement with Singapore. On 1
6
November 1971, it was announced that:
1. Since the safety of navigation through the
Malacca Straits was the responsibility of the three
coastal countries, all three nations should
cooperate towards this end.
2. In order to reach the fullest cooperation, the
states concerned would create a coordinating body
which would comprise only these three coastal
countries
.
3. Safety of navigation through the Straits and
their internationalisation would be considered as
two separate issues. (Vertzberger , 1982, p. 4)
It was this third item on which the littoral states were
divided. Malaysia and Indonesia were willing to accept the
principle of "innocent passage" of international shipping, but
insisted that the Straits were not international waters and
were, instead, territorial seas. Singapore, while expressing
its reservations, stated that it "took note" of the position
of the other two countries. (Vertzberger, 1982, p. 4)
D. MILITARY SIGNIFICANCE OF THE MALACCA STRAITS
Several military forces operate in the waters of the
Straits. Their presence has created global and regional
politico-military complexities which include: political
demands for the establishment of nuclear-free zones; the
movement of military troops to control outbreaks of potential
revolutionary and nationalistic activity in various Indo-
Pacific islands and island groups; quarrels over mineral
rights and fishing fleet intrusions. These issues give clear
testimony to the increasing potential for the need to move,
and possibly deploy, combat troops into the Indo-Pacific area.
Overlapping lines of communication are coupled with barriers
and zones of influence that will affect military planning.
Regional instability may result in troop and supply movements
between the Pacific and Indian Oceans where the Malacca
Straits would be the first choice as a connecting route. Use
of the straits may not be an option if the littoral powers
move to take control of the straits, forcing military planners
to cope with a host of geographic, economic, and political
factors that may influence alternate routing. (Dupuy, 1993,
vol. 3, p. 1253)
When projecting military force, the amount of time
necessary to reach the area of operation is a key
consideration. This time consideration is largely determined
8
by the distance, especially in those areas where naval forces
have to respond rapidly to unforeseen developments. In terms
of sustained deployment, the increased distance from base to
area of deployment has a price associated with time on station
and the overall number of naval units needed to achieve a
given level of presence at any time. This makes free passage
through the Malacca Straits important to all operational
military planning. (MccGwire, 1975, pp. 1062-1070)
When considering the importance of the sea lanes in the
straits region, the relative numerical strength and quality of
naval forces present should be considered. A hypothetical
example will illustrate this point: a regional confrontation
involving regional powers only, with Japan opposed to
Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia. Even though Japan has
decisive qualitative superiority in large modern warships, the
naval balance is inclined toward the littoral states because
of the quantitatively superior air power which they can bring
to bear. The Japanese Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) is much
larger and more modern. However, the Malacca Straits are
beyond the effective range of the ASDF and Japan does not
possess an aircraft carrier to extend the range of its air
power
.
Another advantage enjoyed by the littoral states is that
the Malacca Straits can be covered by artillery or other
shore-based weapon systems and the narrow passage can be
easily mined or blocked by ships sunk in it. These tactics
were employed by Egypt in the Suez Canal in 1956. If the
littoral states were to mine the straits, their air and
artillery cover from mobile shore batteries would be enough
force to prevent effective mine-sweeping operations. (Foss,
1996, pp. 806-807)
The littoral states are capable of inflicting sufficient
damage to render any supposed benefit from naval intervention
very costly. This argument is supported by the fact that the
littoral states possess, in addition to long-range artillery,
Harpoon Anti-ship missiles as well as Exocet Anti-ship
missiles. The navies of the three littoral states have been
sufficiently upgraded with small, fast patrol boats capable of
firing these anti-ship missiles, providing a fast,
inexpensive, reliable, and powerful destructive force.
(Sharpe, 1997, pp. 303-631) The combined sea denial
capability of Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia is impressive
enough to prevent, at least in the short term, sea control by
a hostile navy at either the eastern or western approaches to
the Malacca Straits. In light of the potential for increased
tensions in the Asia/Pacific region, the littoral states can




E. ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES CENTERED ON THE MALACCA STRAITS
The littoral states' concerns pertaining to protection of
the environment in the straits region stem from the potential
consequences of a major oil spill. Malaysia and Indonesia are
fearful that a collision or grounding would result in a
massive oil spill. This is concern of major significance in
that a large part of the population of both countries live
along the coastlines of the straits and these people make
their living off of the fishing industry. Both countries have
extensive fishing areas in and around the Malacca Straits and
in the event of a major oil spill in this region, the fishing
areas, as well as the economic livelihood of those associated
with the fishing industry, would be devastated. While
Singapore's population is less involved in the fishing
industry, the interruption in shipping traffic resulting from
clean-up efforts associated with an oil spill would mean a
significant loss of revenue Singapore' s extensive port
facilities as these ships would likely be required to transit
the Lombok and Makassar Straits instead of the Malacca
Straits. An additional concern for Singapore is the potential
of a collision, resulting in a sinking, or a grounding that
would block the straits given the narrowness of the navigation
canal
.
The crucial question relating to environmental issues in
the Malacca Straits region is whether, and to what extent, the
11
environmental, economic, security, and political requirements
of the littoral states are compatible or at variance with the
interests of the non-littoral states. If these interests can
be uniformly satisfied, then the Malacca Straits can remain an
environmentally protected area and at the same time a globally
important and peaceful sea-lane of commerce. If, however,
these interests prove to be conflicting, then the straits are
likely to become a region of discontent among those competing
for its use. The potential for hostilities could then be
viewed as a relevant and impending concern. (Johnston, 1972,
p. 181)
The littoral states stepped up their efforts to regulate
shipping in the straits region in 1975, when the 237,000-ton
Japanese supertanker Showa Maru ran aground only 5 miles south
of Singapore. Nearly one million gallons of crude oil were
spilled into the Straits. (Leifer, 1978, pp. 62-78) After
this incident, a Malaysian Foreign Office official was quoted
as saying "what we are worried about is the big collision that
will damage our ecology permanently." (New York Times, 28
August 1975, p. 4) More than 150 ships pass through the
straits daily, with at least 25 percent of these tankers
displacing more than 200,000 tons. The potential exists for
a major ecological disaster. Other serious ecological issues
resulting from the increased trade in the region include
greater levels of pollution, the endangerment of many
12
sensitive marine species and the introduction of non-native
biological pests and dangerous predators. Additional negative
ecological effects might result from extensive commercial
ocean bottom mining and the test and disposal of nuclear
materials. (Vertzberger, 1982, p. 9)
By raising the problem of pollution, Malaysia, Singapore,
and Indonesia have emphasized a major issue relating not only
to the environmental protection of the Malacca Straits, but
also to several other sea-lanes and the Southeast Asian waters
in general. This assessment of their actions on the
environmental front, as well as the other facets of the
Malacca Straits, sets the stage for an examination of the
positions of each of the littoral states.
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II. THE LITTORAL STATES
This chapter presents several issues pertaining to the
littoral states to establish the basis for their historical,
political, economic, and national security concerns relating
to the Malacca Straits. An understanding of these issues is
important before considering the significance of the Malacca
Straits to the littoral states and why they would conceivably
resort to military force in protecting their interests.
A. MALAYSIA
1. History
Because of its abundant natural resources and its key
strategic position in the Malacca Straits region, Malaysia has
attracted sailors and merchants from other parts of Asia since
the first century A.D. The states that make up the whole of
Malaysia are the Malay Peninsula, Sabah, and Sarawak. Because
they were skilled navigators themselves, the coastal peoples
of the peninsula and the Malay Archipelago were able to
control the use of the Malacca Straits. Ships carrying goods
from the countries on the Indian Ocean littoral to China had
to pass through the Malacca Straits, making it possible for
Malaysians to establish prosperous entrepot states where the
products of East and West, as well as those of local origin,
were traded. (Bunge, 1985, p. 3)
As a major center of shipping and commerce, Malacca
enjoyed extensive interaction with Chinese, Arab, Malay, and
15
Indian merchants. Malacca was conquered by the Portuguese in
1511 with the Dutch gaining control in 1641. The British took
control in 1795 and by 1826 they had combined the settlements
of Malacca, Penang, and Singapore into the Straits Settlements
Colony. The British later established protectorates over the
Malay Sultanates on the peninsula and in 1895 four of these
became the Federated Malay States. During their reign, the
British developed public administration, public services, and
large-scale rubber and tin production. They were also
instrumental in soliciting immigration from China and India to
provide the additional workers needed for economic expansion.
(Vreeland, 1984, pp. 3-4)
Malaysia was invaded and occupied by the Japanese from
1942 to 1945. At the war's end, there was an increase in
popular demand for independence and in 1957, the Federation of
Malaya was established on the Malayan peninsula. Once
independence from the United Kingdom had been achieved, the
former British colonies of Singapore, Sarawak, and Sabah were
added to the federation. On 16 September 1963, the name
Malaya was changed to Malaysia. Singapore was invited to
leave Malaysia and established its own independence in 1965.
From 1948 to 1960, Malaysia had been thrown into turmoil
by a communist-inspired revolution. Insurgents, mostly
Chinese citizens, tried to gain control through force.
British troops were requested and were instrumental in
16
restoring peace. (Bunge, 1985, pp. 47-48)
2. Politico-Military Background and Policy
Malaysia, a federated constitutional monarchy, consists
of thirteen component states and two federal territories. As
a member of the British Commonwealth, it has a bicameral
parliamentary form of government. The paramount ruler is
elected and serves as the commander-in-chief of the armed
forces and the leader of the Islamic faith in Malaysia. The
states exercise limited powers through an assembly and a chief
minister. Of these, nine have hereditary rulers, most using
the title of sultan. The judicial system is based on English
common law with the Supreme Court reviewing legislative acts
at the request of the Supreme Head of the Federation.
Noninvolvement in Great Power conflicts, or nonalignment,
as Malaysian leaders calls it, remains one of the more
important aspects of their foreign policy. Desiring neither
to alienate nonaligned neighbors such as Indonesia, Singapore,
Burma, and India nor to displease China, Malaysia did not join
the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization at its formation in
1954, commonly viewed as an anticommunist, pro-Western
military alliance. This, however, did not prevent Malaysia
from signing a bilateral mutual defense pact with Britain.
The rational behind this bilateral mutual defense pact with
Britain was since it was not concluded in the context of any
East-West conflict, it did not contradict the nonalignment
17
policy. (Vreeland, 1985, p. 227)
Malaysia is linked with Singapore militarily through the
1971 Five-Powers Defense Agreement, an arrangement under which
the' security of Malaysia and Singapore is guaranteed by
Britain, Australia, and New Zealand. Malaysia also cooperates
extensively with Indonesia in maintaining the security of the
Malacca Straits. (LePoer, 1991, p. 211) Malaysia also has
formal diplomatic relations with all sides of the
international scene. Malaysia stands as a moderate member of
the Non-Aligned Movement of Islamic Countries. The mainstay
of Malaysian foreign policy centers around support for
regional cooperation, especially within the Association of
Southeast Asia Nations (ASEAN), of which it is a member.
(Broinowski, 1982, pp. 10-11) Malaysia also has recently been
promoting new initiatives that focus on Japan and South Korea
as models for economic development.
3. Foreign Economic and Military Assistance
Far greater emphasis is placed on receiving economic
assistance from major powers than on soliciting military
assistance. During the period 1970 to 1984, U.S. financial
commitments totaled US$170 million. From 1970 to 1987, other
Western nations' contributions were a staggering US$3.8
billion. (Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook,
1995, p. 263) United States military aid, in the form of
Foreign Military Sales credits, totaled over US$17 million
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from 1972 to 1982. Additionally, a small number of armed
forces personnel have received advanced military and technical
training from military institutions in Australia, Britain,
India, and the United States. (Bunge, 1984, p. 258)
Malaysia' s military equipment is predominantly of Western
origin, with the majority of it coming from the United Kingdom
and the United States in the form of armored vehicles, ships,
and aircraft. (Dupuy, 1993, vol. 4, p. 1603) Malaysia
committed limited military support to United Nations
peacekeeping forces in the Congo in 1960 and again in Namibia
in 1983. (Dupuy, 1993, vol. 4, p. 1603)
4. Defense Industry and Military Structure
Malaysia is the. world's third largest manufacturer of
semiconductor devices and the world' s largest exported of
semiconductors. Malaysia makes an indirect but substantial
contribution to the command and control, guidance, and other
electronic-based military systems of nations around the globe.
(World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1995, p. 134)
Malaysia's defense structure comprises the civilian
Ministry of Defense and three separate military services.
These are the Royal Malaysian Army, the Royal Malaysian Navy,
and the Royal Malaysian Air Force. Command of the armed
forces is vested by the Constitution in the supreme head of
the federation, more commonly referred to as the paramount
ruler. It is under his authority that the defense
19
establishment carries out all of their activities. Further
specified by the Constitution is the condition that all
officers hold the paramount ruler' s commission and that he has
the prerogative of granting mercy in military offenses that
are tried by courts-martial. However, the power to declare
war resides in the parliament. Through this arrangement, the
armed forces are accountable to both the paramount ruler and
the people, the latter exercising control through elected
representatives in the parliament, which determines the size
and composition of the services and appropriations needed to
support them. (The Statesman's Yearbook, 1997, p. 871)
Malaysia' s Defense Guidance document contains three basic
tenants: self reliance, regional cooperation, and extra-
regional initiatives. With regard to self reliance, the
Malaysian government has undertaken a considerable military
modernization program. Malaysia' s defense budget is one of
the largest within ASEAN and accounts for approximately 5% of
its GDP. Due to its perceived need to protect coastal waters
and expanded economic zones, the Royal Malaysian Air Force and
the Royal Malaysian Navy have been the major beneficiaries of
this modernization program. For example, Great Britain
recently sold 28 Hawk fighters to the Royal Malaysian Air
Force. Add to that the 18 MiG-29 fighters from Russia and the
8 F/A-18s from the United States and Malaysia has an air force
which could be a serious contender in a hostile environment.
20
(Berry, 1997, p. 35)
Ministry of Defense officials were careful to explain
this modernization program as an attempt to boost the domestic
economy and Malaysia's contribution to regional stability. In
1994 Defense Minister Najib indicated that increased
deterrence was one important goal of modernization while also
pointing out that the armed forces needed to stay current with
technological advances to remain proficient. He further
suggested these technologies would benefit the civilian
economy as well. (East Asia Daily Report, 4 March 1994, p.
51) Additionally, Defense Minister Najib argued that a
stronger Malaysian military would mean a stronger ASEAN and
would also permit Malaysia to continue support for United
Nations peacekeeping operations. (East Asia Daily Report, 1
August 1994, p. 79) Najib' s successor as Defense Minister,
Syed Hamid, noted that the defense modernization program
provided "leverage" for other industries in Malaysia. (East
Asian Daily Report, 8 December 1995, p. 53) He stated in
March 1996 that Malaysia was not involved in an arms race, but
was simply updating equipment which had become obsolete. By
couching the modernization program in this way, Syed Hamid
hoped to allay suspicions within the region and beyond
concerning Malaysia's intentions. (East Asian Daily Report,
7 March 1996, p. 55)
21
5. Alliances
Malaysia professes a firm commitment to a position of
nonalignment . However, membership in various military and
economic organizations suggest otherwise. It is a charter
member of ASEAN and the defense-aligned Five-Power Defense
Arrangement (FDPA), whose other members include Britain,
Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore. Cooperation with
predominantly Chinese Singapore has, at times, proven to be
quite problematic. Malaysia has entered into several
regional agreements outside the framework of its more formal
memberships. While a few of these are related to mutual
defense concerns, the majority involve economic cooperation.
Malaysia also maintains membership in the United Nations as
well as a wide variety of international economic, trade, and
health organizations. (Central Intelligence Agency, The World
Factbook, 1995, p. 263)
Malaysia's two major extra-regional defense arrangements
are membership in the Five Power Defense Arrangement (FPDA),
which was formed in 1971, and its security relationship with
the United States. The reasons for these arrangements were
because, at the time, Malaysia and Singapore did not have the
air and naval forces to defend their air space and coastal
waters. There was also a concern that the United States might
depart the region after the Vietnam war and that British
Forces might also leave the region after its "East of Suez"
22
announcement in the early 1970s. (International Herald
Tribune, 3 September 1996, p. 4) Currently, one of the major
challenges for the FPDA members is defining new roles in the
post-Cold War era. (The Sunday Times-Singapore, 15 September
1996, p. 27)
6. National Security Concerns
In spite of a recent down-turn in economic performance,
Malaysia's overall economic record has been impressive. This,
coupled with the ability to service debt, makes Malaysia well
regarded internationally. The current financial crisis that
is affecting Southeast Asia as a whole, appears to have little
to do with Malaysia. In the February 26, 1997 issue of the
Crossborder Monitor, forecasters predicted Malaysia's economic
performance would continue to be robust over the next five
years. Strong investment and export growth, the same factors
that fueled impressive growth over the past ten years, are
cited as reasons. These same forecasters also predicted that
Malaysia' s current economic slowdown would bottom-out sometime
in 1997, but that they would still achieve GDP growth of 8 .
1
percent. (Crossborder Monitor, 1997, p. 7) Four months later,
in the June 18, 1997 issue of the Crossborder Monitor
forecasters adjusted their prediction to reflect a GDP growth-
rate of only 7.6 percent. The reason for the re-evaluation was
an observed reduction in bank lending to the manufacturing
sector in 1996 and to the construction sector in early 1997.
23
(Crossborder Monitor, 1997, p. 7)
The uncertainty over Malaysia' s current perceived
financial difficulties is directly traceable to neighboring
Thailand. Nervous fund managers, who overlooked Thailand's
mounting economic problems for so long, are attempting to
anticipate the region's next banking crisis. Malaysians need
not worry. S. Jayasankaran filed a report from Kuala Lumpur
in the September 25, 1997 issue of the Far Eastern Economic
Review stating "Many analysts believe that the Malaysian
banking system is sturdier than most in the region and
discount the possibility of a systemic Thai-style collapse."
(Jayasankaran, 1997, p. 92) As further evidence of Malaysia's
apparent economic security, the July 12, 1997 issue of The
Economist reported that "...Malaysia (is) better-positioned to
ride out South-East Asia's currency troubles." (The Economist,
1997, p. 62)
However, there are four important sources of
international concern not directly related to the financial
sector. First, Malaysia is involved in a complex dispute with
China, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Vietnam over the rights to
the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. Second, Brunei
has expressed a desire to purchase the Malaysian salient that
divides Brunei into two parts on the north shore of Borneo.
Malaysia vehemently refuses to consider this offer. Third,
Philippine officials continue to press the issue on a twenty-
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year-old claim to Sabah. Fourth, Malaysia is involved in a
fishing-rights conflict with Thailand. (Dupuy, 1993, vol. 4,
pp. 1602-03)
An example illustrating the extent to which fishing-
rights conflicts have escalated involves Thailand and its
aggressive, trespassing fishing fleet. Thailand's recent
violations of its neighbors' territorial waters has resulted
in several armed responses. One observer has noted that these
activities have turned the seas of Southeast Asia into a
battle ground. Experts are concerned that continued disregard
for territorial fishing areas could pose a threat to regional
security if regional navies are drawn into the fray while
attempting to protect their areas.
To supply the country' s huge fish-processing industry and
preserve its place as the world's leading seafood exporter,
Thailand's fishermen are plundering the waters off Burma,
Malaysia, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Indonesia. As these
countries have become more intent and better equipped to
defend their marine resources, they have begun to fight back.
One such incident occurred in 1995 when Thai warships became
involved in a firefight with Vietnamese coastal patrol boats
that were attempting to arrest six Thai trawlers in the Gulf
of Thailand. Two Vietnamese sailors and one Thai fisherman
were killed in the exchange. Each country justified its
actions by claiming that the clash took place in its
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territorial waters. Five other Thai fishermen were killed
when a Burmese naval vessel fired on their trawler later that
same year. The Malaysian navy killed two Thai fishermen --
one a 14-year-old boy -- during a 1996 pursuit. Southeast
Asian countries continue to claim and defend often-overlapping
exclusive economic zones. Consequently, with better-equipped
navies, they have the means to enforce their claims as well as
to protect their fisheries from encroachment. (Saywell, 1997,
pp. 53-54)
One of the most pressing strategic concerns for Malaysia
is maintaining territorial integrity. This is due to
Malaysia' s important geostrategic positioning in the Malacca
Straits region as well as its own disjointed geographical
orientation. Sabah and Sarawak are separated from peninsular
Malaysia by 100 miles of the South China Sea. Important
future energy sources lie within islands and atolls in the
South China Sea to which Malaysia has claims. There are
additional oil and natural gas fields west of Sabah and
Sarawak. Keeping a watchful eye on these vast areas is a
source of continuing concern for Malaysian officials. (Berry,
1997, p. 31) Other primary national security interests are
domestic peace and stability. Malaysia is a multi-ethnic
society with a population comprised of approximately sixty
percent Malay, thirty percent Chinese, and eight percent
Indian. Significant ethnic clashes occurred in the late 1960s
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however, the government intervened with programs which
appeased the contending ethnic groups and peace was restored.
Malaysia still faces some difficult ethnic issues which place
a premium on economic development. Provided the economy
continues to perform as it had prior to the modest slow down
experienced from mid-1996 to the present, ethnic tensions are
not likely to pose a problem for officials. To this end,
Malaysia's Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad announced in 1994
a lofty goal entitled "Vision 2020." (Berry, 1997, p. 32)
The intention of this program is to facilitate Malaysia'
s
becoming a full industrial nation-state by the year 2020.
Clearly, one of the most desired outcomes of this program is
to minimize ethnic tensions through the attainment of economic
benefits for all ethnic groups. Malaysian economic experts
have postulated that the economy would have to average seven
percent annual growth until the year 2020 to achieve all of
the goals of the program. This assumes continued harmony at
home as well as regional peace and stability.
Malaysian national security concerns are, in fact, highly
sensitive to continued regional peace and stability. These
conditions have had a profound effect on Malaysia's rapid
economic growth and development. The 1990s witnessed
Malaysia's rate of GDP growth as being one of the highest, not
only in East Asia, but throughout the world. An example
supporting this observation is that the economy grew by 9.2
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percent in 1994 and 9.3 percent in 1995. Economic growth in
1996 slipped to a still impressive 8.5 percent. (The Stanford
Report, 1996, p. 61) By contrast, the economic growth of the
Philippines was roughly half that of Malaysia, with increases
of 4.4 percent in 1994 and 4.8 percent in 1995. (Berry, 1997,
pp. 31-33) This economic growth is partially explained by
Malaysia's export policies. Therefore, maintaining access to
the vital sealanes in the Malacca Straits and the South China
Sea to ensure continued economic success has become another
important strategic concern for Malaysia.
During the Cold War, Malaysia was concerned about the use
of the Malacca Straits by the superpowers, the United States
and the Soviet Union. During this period, Malaysia,
Singapore, and Indonesia, were aware that their collective
weakness would not enable them to impose their views on the
superpowers concerning peace in the region. The littoral
states' goal was to achieve a situation in which U.S. and
Soviet naval forces in the straits region and Indian Ocean
were balanced at reasonably low levels. (Muertopo, 1977, p.
215) Anxieties over this matter were expressed by a high
official of Malaysia's Foreign Ministry:
We are very concerned about the passage of warships
from the South China Sea to the Indian Ocean.
Suppose a war broke out there. We could be in the
middle. This we cannot allow to happen. (New York
Times, 28 August 1975, p. 4)
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The end of the Cold War has not ended Malaysia's anxieties
over regional confrontation. Malaysia's security concerns
have increased as a result of the growing disputes over the
Spratly Islands and the potential resources there, sea bottom
mining, and ever-expanding exclusive economic zones. (Berry,
1997, p. 34) Any conflict resulting from any of these
concerns or others will almost certainly spill over into the
Malacca Straits, threatening the security of Malaysia.
When addressing the issues of regional threats, Malaysian
officials choose their words carefully. For example, the term
"threats" is never used, but rather "challenges" or "defense
of strategic interests." The rationale behind this caution is
to avoid offending the other countries of ASEAN and more
importantly, China. (Berry, 1997, pp. 32-33) With the Soviet
presence now gone, the United States force reductions in the
Asia/Pacific region, and China increasing its strength in the
South China Sea, Malaysian officials became concerned. Major
General Raja Abdul Rashid, Director of Intelligence, Malaysian
Armed Forces voiced these concerns in a 1990 interview.
Although he did not use the phrase "power vacuum" in the
interview, he was clearly indicating concerns over the
possibility that China might try to replace Soviet and United
States military forces with its own. (East Asian Daily
Report, 22 February 1990, pp. 39-42) In a December 1992
interview with the same security theme, Malaysian Defense
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Minister Datuk Sri Najib Tun Razak expressed his concern that
if China acquired nuclear submarines, an aircraft carrier, or
developed its military bases in southern China for power
projection purposes, Malaysia and other countries in Southeast
Asia would have drastically increased security concerns.
(International Herald Tribune, 21 December 1992, p. 2)
However, by the mid-1990s, Prime Minister Mahathir made it
clear that Malaysia did not consider China to be a threat.
The apparent rationale behind this evaluation was a May 1996
visit to Malaysia by China's Vice Prime Minister Zhu Rongji.
He explained that China's military modernization was defensive
in nature and not directed at any country or region. (East
Asian Daily Report, 24 May 1996, p. 49) To ensure there was
no confusion over perceptions of China's military
modernization plans, Prime Minister Mahathir traveled to
Beijing and reiterated that he was confident that China did
not have expansionist intentions. (East Asian Daily Report,
28 August 1996, pp. 55-56)
B. SINGAPORE
1. History
The history of Singapore has little to do with war and
politics and more to do with commerce. Legend suggests that
Singapore was an important shipping and trade center as early
as 700 A.D. Sir Thomas Stanford Raffles, a British East India
Company representative in 1819, anticipated the commercial
30
potential of Singapore. The British purchased Singapore in
1824 and by 1825 its major port facility was handling trade
shipments that exceeded the ports of Malacca and Penang
combined. These three areas were joined together as the
Straits Settlement Colony in 1830. Protectorates were then
established over the Malay Sultanates on the peninsula.
This prosperity was further enhanced by an increase in
the world demand for rubber and tin during the twentieth
century. As a result, Singapore was transformed into a major
global port. This prompted the British to become concerned
with its defense. They constructed a naval base in Singapore
1921. Singapore was captured by the Japanese in 1942. It was
regained by the British in 1945.
When Penang and Malacca were made a British Crown Colony
in 1946, Singapore remained separate. It became self-
governing in 1954 and, in 1963, Singapore became a member of
the independent Federation of Malaysia, formerly Malaya. As
a result of Indonesia's adoption of a so-called confrontation
policy against Malaysia later in that same year, Singapore
experienced a significant loss in trade and widespread
animosity among other Malaysian states and Indonesia. Before
these problems could be resolved, Singapore left Malaysia to
become independent in August 1965. (Dupuy, 1993, vol. 5, p.
2432)
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With a total land area equal to three and a half times
the size of Washington, D.C., the Republic of Singapore is a
city-state island located at the tip of the Malaysian
peninsula. Occupying an enviable position as the focal point
of Southeast Asian ocean routes, its economic position in the
world is greatly out of proportion to its tiny size.
Singapore's economic well-being is singularly dependent on
world markets
.
Singapore is the center for sea and air transportation
and communications in Southeast Asia and is the world's second
busiest port, exceeded only by Rotterdam. With plans of
becoming a world business center, Singapore has aggressively
pursued development efforts to reduce its vulnerability to
external economic swings. (LePoer, 1991, p. 29)
2. Politico-Military Background and Policy
Singapore is a parliamentary republic of the British
Commonwealth. Features of the government include a ceremonial
president with a four-year term, a prime minister and cabinet
with executive power, responsible to a unicameral parliament.
The Prime Minister's executive power extends to control of the
military. Issues of substance are overseen by the minister of
defense who is responsible to the cabinet and parliament.
In spite of careful attempts to maintain cordial
relationships with all nations, Singapore has been less than
successful in achieving this objective. There have been
32
difficulties with Sweden resulting from alleged arms transfers
and bribery of the Swedish Bofors Company. In August 1989,
Singapore announced that it would allow and receive an
important U.S. military base and would resume joint military
exercises with Malaysia. Singapore maintained strong
opposition to the Vietnam backed government in Cambodia.
Singapore has shown sympathy in recent times with the
government of China and expressed concerns that international
media attention may encourage a push for more rapid changes in
foreign policy than are politically and economically healthy.
In terms of policy direction, Singapore has focused both
regionally and supra-regionally . These policies are designed
to encourage the remarkable economic progress enjoyed since
the early 1960s although greater attention will be given to
improvements in management and diversification. With due
consideration given to its policy objectives, the military
will play a subordinate role, providing continuing support for
other ASEAN members concerning conflict in Indochina, as well
as its own international interests. (Dupuy, 1993, vol. 5, p.
2433)
3. Foreign Economic and Military Assistance
Between 1970 and 1983, the United States provided US$590
million in export-import aid to Singapore. From 1970 to 1989,
Singapore received US$1 billion in aid from other Western
countries. (Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook,
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1995, p. 380) Singapore's financial organization memberships
include the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank,
and the Asian Development Bank. Loans from the World Bank and
the Asian Development Bank were secured and used to finance
development projects relating to water supply, electric power
generation and distribution, sewerage, telephone services,
educational services, and environmental control. Fourteen
loans were secured from the World Bank between 1963 and 1975
with estimated outstanding balances in 1988 totaling US$35.1
billion. Additionally, fourteen loans were secured from the
Asian Development Bank between 1969 and 1980 with estimated
outstanding balances in 1988 totaling US$45.4 million. There
were no other loans secured after 1980. (LePoer, 1991, p.
165)
The predominant sources of Singapore's military equipment
and defense subsidization are the United States, the United
Kingdom, Sweden, Germany, and France. Of particular note was
Britain's contribution of US$94 million in grants and US$281
million in loans in 1971 as part of a compensation package
resulting from the withdrawal of Britain's armed forces.
Singapore was permitted to take possession of all British
military installations, thus enabling the government to focus
most of its spending on materiel, operations, and training.
(LePoer, 1991, p. 238) Equipment supplies are in the form of
armored vehicles, ships, and aircraft. Additionally, the
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United States maintains a small training program in Singapore.
(Dupuy, 1993, vol. 5, p. 2433)
4. Defense Industry and Military Structure
The industrial base in Singapore includes petroleum
refining, electronics, rubber processing and product
manufacture, ship repair, biotechnology, and trade. Through
these a substantial contribution to the defense industries of
major arms-manufacturing nations is made. However, they do
not constitute a major defense industry for Singapore.
(Hunter, 1997, p. 1137)
Though they lack a definite defense industry, Singapore
does employ an extensive and comprehensive defense force. The
military is headed by the Minister of Defense and his joint
staff, who maintain close and effective control of the 55, 500-
member military. This includes the army, navy, air force, and
army reserves. All males 18 years of age and older are
subject to a two or three-year service commitment after which
they are placed in the reserves. The Enlistment Act of 1970
requires enlisted men to remain in the reserves until they
turn forty and officers remain on the reserve rolls until the
age of fifty. (LePoer, 1991, p. 220)
Singapore's defense structure is based on a comprehensive
national security policy which focuses on both deterrence and
diplomacy. Singapore has the most dominant economy in
Southeast Asia and is more than willing to allocate the
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necessary funds to develop a potent military force. Defense
spending is approximately six percent of its GDP, the largest
percentage of the largest GDP in ASEAN. (The Stanford Report,
1996, p. 63)
Singapore's military modernization program is well
established, focusing on air and naval equipment. Because of
its small size, Singapore has to be prepared to fight battles
outside of its territory. Singapore would prefer to resolve
disputes through diplomacy if possible, and its membership in
regional organizations such as ASEAN and the ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF) provide important opportunities to do so. (Berry,
1997, p. 44)
The U. S . -Singapore security relationship is an integral
part of Singapore's defense structure. Singapore relies
heavily on the support of two major American military units
stationed there. These are the 4 97th Combat Training Squadron
and the Command Logistics Group Western Pacific. The former
unit is a United States Air Force (USAF) organization, the
latter belongs to the U.S. Navy. Approximately 160 Air Force
and Navy personnel are assigned to these two units which are
located in a warehouse at the Port of Sembawang. In 1995, 65
U.S. Navy ships made port calls in Singapore. Additionally,
there were six major USAF exercises, code named Commando
Sling, with the Singapore Air Force in 1995. The exercises
had a duration of one month, the USAF providing units from
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bases in Japan, Alaska, and Arizona. Military-to-military
ties are further enhanced by Singapore Air Force units
training in the United States. These units consist of a
squadron of F-16s operating out of Luke Air Force Base in
Arizona and a small number of CH-47 helicopters in Grand
Prairie, Texas. In addition to ship visits and joint training
exercises, ships of the U.S. Seventh Fleet pass through the
Malacca Straits and South China Sea on a regular basis.
(Berry, 1997, p. 48)
5. Alliances
Singapore' s Minister for Foreign Affairs Suppiah
Dhanabalan described country's foreign policy in 1981 as "a
willingness to be friends with all who sought friendship, to
trade with any state regardless of ideology, to remain
nonaligned, and to continue to cooperate closely with ASEAN
members." (LePoer, 1991, p. 207) . In a friendly gesture
toward its neighbors and in recognition of its own regional
heritage, Singapore has maintained its membership in the
Nonaligned Movement. However, Singapore has consistently
rejected neutrality as a foreign policy option. The rationale
behind this decision suggests that the leadership has reasoned
that avoiding entanglements with the major powers would leave
Singapore far too vulnerable to threats from regional
neighbors. (LePoer, 1991, p. 209) Singapore is linked with
Malaysia militarily as a result of their co-membership in the
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Five-Powers Defense Agreement (FPDA) , under which the security
of Singapore and Malaysia is guaranteed by Britain, Australia,
and New Zealand. Additionally, Singapore has cooperated
extensively with Malaysia and Indonesia, though without the
benefit of a formal, written agreement, in maintaining the
security of the Malacca Straits. In addition to membership in
the FPDA, Singapore maintains memberships in ASEAN, the United
Nations, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) , and an assortment of
other trade, economic, and health organizations. (Central
Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, 1995, p. 380)
6. National Security Concerns
Geography is a major determinant for Singapore's
definition of vital national security interests. Singapore is
located just off the southern coast of Malaysia and
strategically placed at the nexus of the Malacca Straits and
the South China Sea. Singapore has few natural resources and
is situated between two much larger neighbors, Malaysia to the
north and Indonesia to the south. With a population that is
about 75% ethnic Chinese, 15% Malay, and 5% Indian, Singapore
is frequently referred to as a Chinese island in a Malay sea.
Maintaining one of the highest per-capita GDP rates in Asia
(over US$10,000) and possessing an outstanding performance
record in Pacific trade and commerce, Singapore depends
heavily on peace and stability in the region so that freedom
of navigation is guaranteed through the vital sealanes which
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are in close proximity to the island and absolutely essential
to continued economic well-being. There are numerous
multinational corporations making their headquarters in
Singapore. They are attracted to Singapore's political
stability and geographical location. If the regional peace
was disrupted, Singapore' s economy would be seriously
affected. Therefore, regional peace and stability are major
national security objectives. (Berry, 1997,' p. 41)
Another important national security concern is regime
survival. The People's Action Party (PAP) has been the
dominant political party since Lee Kuan Yew became its leader
in 1959. He was also Singapore's Prime Minister from 1965,
when the country gained independence, until his retirement in
1990. Lee, does however, maintain the position of Senior
Minister and continues to be a major political actor in
Singapore, even though Goh Chok Tong is the Prime Minister.
PAP leaders and most Singaporeans are convinced that the party
needs to stay in power if the multiracial society is to stay
in balance and the prosperous economy is to continue.
(LePoer, 1991, p. 4)
Security threats to Singapore are regional in nature
rather than domestic. Any economic disruptions in Southeast
Asia resulting from conflict and interference with the
sealanes in the Malacca Straits and the South China Sea would
be devastating to Singapore. When Malaysian and Philippine
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government officials were reluctant to mention China as a
specific regional threat, their counterparts in Singapore were
more inclined to do so. One Singaporean official made the
point that his country did not establish normal diplomatic
relations with China until 1990, the last of the ASEAN
countries to do so. This delay was primarily for political
reasons because of Singapore's ethnic Chinese majority and the
fear from other nations within the region that Singapore would
end up doing China's bidding. (Berry, 1997, p. 42)
The U.S. -Japan security treaty is perceived by many
Singaporeans as being the key to future Japanese behavior. As
long as the United States remains connected to Japan and
maintains military forces there, Singaporeans will not view
Japan as a major threat. This national perspective provides
an interesting comparison with Malaysia. Several Malaysians
expressed skepticism about the April 1996 Clinton-Hashimoto
decision to consider the possibility of expanded security
cooperation. Those interviewed in Singapore were encouraged
by this decision because security cooperation would be
enhanced and that would make it more likely that the United
States will stay involved with Japan. (Berry, 1997, p. 43)
The current financial crisis that is affecting Southeast
Asia has not bypassed Singapore, though they are holding up
better than most. Financial services play a critical role in
Singapore's economy. They contribute twelve percent to the
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total GDP and employ five percent of the workforce. When
combined with business services, the financial sector makes up
fully twenty-eight percent of GDP. With so much of their
financial security tied to banking, Singapore would appear to
be vulnerable to the current monetary slump. (Heibert, 1997,
p. 106) Falling currency values throughout Southeast Asia
appear to have been triggered initially by the rapid decline
in the Thai Baht beginning in early July 1997. According to
Michael McNertney, managing director at Chase Manhattan Bank
in Jakarta, the effects of the falling Baht on other regional
currencies were anticipated because of their inter-relation
with each other and the domino-effect. "Rightly or wrongly,
this region is seen to be integrated; there is a block
mentality." (Sender, 1997, p. 61)
In spite of their currency suffering some devaluation
along with the rest of Southeast Asia, Singapore' s banks have
continued to grow. The United Overseas Bank recorded earnings
growth of thirteen percent in the first half of 1997 while the
Overseas Union Bank posted earnings growth of twenty-seven
percent. (Heibert, 1997, pp. 106-108)
Singapore' s Senior Minister and former Prime Minister,
Lee Kwan Yew warned domestic banks in his National Day speech
in mid-August 1997 that the reason they were continuing to do
well was not because they were efficient but because they were
protected from competition. Lee said, "We are going to face
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very serious challenges in tournaments that we assumed we were
going to win year after year." (Hiebert, 1997, p. 106)
Within days of this speech, Singapore's government announced
that it had launched a financial-review panel to look for ways
to inject new vigor into Singapore's banking sector.
C. INDONESIA
1. History
The islands of the Indonesian archipelago have long been
the focus of traders and colonizers intent on exploiting its
rich natural resources. Many traders have also been
interested in controlling the sea routes between China and
India. Beginning in the sixteenth century, Portuguese,
Spanish, Dutch, and English merchants sought the cloves,
peppers, nutmeg, and mace that were found in abundance on the
islands. The establishment of a colonial administration on
Java by the Dutch in the nineteenth century, facilitated the
intense and highly profitable cultivation and export of cash
crops such as coffee and sugar. Then, in the late nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, the modern industries of the
West, as well as Japan, were in need of the oil, rubber, and
tin also found in abundance in the archipelago. These vast
quantities of various, highly prized resources, made the
Indonesian archipelago a rich prize for nations wishing to
establish or maintain a dominant economic or political
position.
42
An important consequence of the world' s commercial
interest in Indonesia over the centuries was the rise of
indigenous maritime empires that came to control the trade
within the archipelago. The Srivijaya empire lasted from the
seventh to the fourteenth centuries. Located on Sumatra, the
Srivijaya empire dominated inter-island trade because of its
control of the Malacca Straits. In the late sixteenth century,
the Dutch began to exercise their influence over the Straits
region. By this time, the Dutch had a sizeable shipping fleet
and a capable navy. Surviving wars with both Spain and
Portugal in the last decade of the sixteenth century, the
Dutch remained a dominant power in the Straits region,
eventually establishing the United East India Company.
The Dutch continued to control the Indonesian archipelago
and the Malacca Straits well into the eighteenth century.
However, their success in enforcing a trade monopoly in the
archipelago led to their own demise as the British and French
began growing spices in their own territories, keeping prices
down and eventually causing the United East India Company to
go bankrupt. The British assumed control of Indonesia and the
Malacca Straits from the Dutch when, in 1795 French
revolutionary troops occupied the Netherlands. It was not
until 1816 that Dutch authority reestablished in Indonesia and
over the Malacca Straits. (Bunge, 1983, pp. 20-21)
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The Dutch colonial empire, as it stood at the beginning
of the twentieth century, provided the framework for a unified
Indonesian nation. During this time progressive Dutch
officials sought to promote educational reform and self-
government for Indonesians within the colonial political
system. This act of good will by the Dutch only spurred the
Indonesians on to demand greater political autonomy and
increasing anti-colonial resistance.
In the late 1920s, Sukarno ascended to a position of
prominence among Southeast Asian political leaders. He was
Indonesia' s first national leader and eventually its president
from the beginning of Indonesia's independence until he was
forced to retire from political life in 1966. Sukarno had
been closely allied with Islamic leaders and communists
during the early days of the Nationalist movement. During
this time, the Dutch did not respond to any of the groups'
demands. When the Dutch colonists were finally deposed, it
was not attributable to the Nationalists, Marxists or the
Moslems but rather to the Japanese who by then exerted
complete control over the region beginning in 1942. The
Japanese occupation and control lasted more than three years
and was a watershed in the emerging nation's history. The
Dutch image of invincibility, which had grown to mythical
proportions since at least the end of the Java War in 1830,
had been easily shattered by Japanese forces. (Bunge, 1983,
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p. 39) To the Japanese, the Malacca Straits were vital links
in their wartime strategy. Their primary concern was
maintaining control of these strategically important waterways
which they used extensively to ship the bulk of their war
supplies. They were also interested in controlling the
abundant natural resources of the region, namely rubber and
petroleum.
During this time, Sukarno was the leader of the
Indonesian Nationalist Party. He agreed in early 1942 to
cooperate with the Japanese. This seemed to be the best
opportunity to secure independence for the archipelago. In
July 1944, the Japanese found themselves in an increasingly
desperate position which led to the unexpected decision to
grant Indonesia its independence. The official announcement
occurred on September 7, 1944 and served as a vindication for
Sukarno and his decision to cooperate with the Japanese.
Sukarno's position as the new head of state was quite short
lived. When the Dutch returned after the war, he was forced
to relinquish his post. He did, however, remain involved as
a leader of the independence movement. As a figurehead
president, he was extensively involved in the negotiations
with the Dutch which resulted in the granting of republican
rule of Java and Sumatra to the Central Indonesian National
" Committee. In 1947, the Dutch were forced to use a naval
blockade to prevent the republican forces from spreading their
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influence. Later, in early 1949, the United Nations prodded
the Dutch to relinquish control of Indonesia and on 1 July
1950, the Republic of the United States of Indonesia was
officially recognized. (Leifer, 1978, p. 15)
Despite the first national elections in 1955,
parliamentary control was extremely difficult to achieve and
maintain. During the 1950s and 1960s, violence and
insurrection were the order of the day. There were
unsuccessful rebellions in Sumatra, Sulavesi, and other
islands in 1957 and a series of short-lived national
governments. Attempting to regain control through an
independent executive rather than by parliamentary rule,
Sukarno opted for a so-called Guided Democracy in 1959. As a
result of the establishment of an authoritarian regime,
Indonesia became aligned with other Asian communist states,
bolstering the importance of the Indonesian Communist Party
(PKI). The PKI gradually gained control and in 1965 took
steps to arm its followers thereby enabling them to become a
potent armed force. The PKI-supported forces were met with
resistance from Indonesian army leaders and on 1 October 1965
PKI-supported forces attempted to seize national power. PKI
forces managed to occupy key locations in Jakarta where six
senior Indonesian generals were kidnaped and murdered.
Eventually, the Indonesian army put down the coup attempt, and
in Java and Bali thousands of communists were killed, leaving
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a lasting emotional turmoil that is still evident. Sukarno
tried to restore the PKI's position but evidence of
mismanagement and misconduct rapidly diminished his popular
support. By March 1966 Sukarno was forced to relinquish key
military and political power to Suharto, a popular leader who
rallied the country to defeat the coup attempt. One year
later Suharto was named acting president and in 1968 was
elected president in his own right. He has been reelected
every five years since then. (Dupuy, 1993, vol. 3, pp. 1248-
49)
2. Politico-Military Background and Policy
Indonesia' s political value system is authoritarian and
paternalistic, with an emphasis on civil-service employment.
This is a direct result of Hindu-Buddhist and Islamic
influences and of the Indonesian intellectuals who fought for
freedom. They found certain aspects of Western tradition and
liberal political practices appealing and incorporated them
into their own distinct system. The predominant political
party, known as Golkar (Golongan Karja, meaning Functional
Groups), claims to be the voice for more than 270 affiliated
groups from all walks of life. Golkar carries the force,
influence and status of a government party. Its recent voting
strength has been nearly 75 percent. (Dupuy, 1993, vol. 3, p.
1249)
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President Suharto functions as both leader and chief of
state. As the head of the executive branch and the cabinet,
he selects all of the members. There is a unicameral
legislature consisting of a House of Representatives with 500
members, 100 of whom are appointed and the remaining 400 being
elected. A second government body is the People's
Consultative Assembly with 920 members, half of whom are
selected through other than elective processes. This is the
body that elects the president and the vice-president and
therefore, in theory, determines the national policy. There
is a Supreme Court, the highest judiciary body. Universal
suffrage exists for those more than 18 and for all married
persons, regardless of age. (Bunge, 1983, p. 183)
National military forces (TNI-Tentara Nasional Indonesia)
provide for the national defense and fulfill a number of
sociopolitical roles. Under Sukarno, the armed forces gained
extensive political influence. The generals became deeply
entrenched, proving quite difficult to dislodge. Overall, the
military has a great deal of distrust for civil authorities,
special interest organizations or ideological groups.
As a consequence of the PKI's unsuccessful efforts to
infiltrate the armed forces and the failed 1965 coup attempt,
the TNI purged its ranks of officers suspected of involvement.
Suharto then combined the army, navy and air force into a
single unified command with the army serving as the dominant
48
force. Suharto was now firmly in control of his country.
The focus of internal governmental policies continues to
be issues of economics and stability, with a great deal of
emphasis on the need to strike a balance between democracy and
firm leadership. (Dupuy, 1993, vol. 3, p. 1249)
3. Foreign Economic and Military Assistance
Indonesia has received various amounts of economic and
military assistance which fluctuate depending upon evolving
international and political relationships. From 1967 to 1975,
private foreign investments comprised roughly 48 percent of
all approved investments in Indonesia. Of that amount, 42
percent came from Japan, nine percent from Hong Kong, four
percent from the United States. (Bunge, 1983, p. 172) During
Sukarno' s reign, the amount of aid provided by the United
States was about one-tenth that of the Soviet Union. However,
since the time of Suharto's rule, the United States has
supplanted the Soviet Union as Indonesia's primary economic
and military assistance provider, albeit on a smaller scale.
For example, in 1988 the United States supplied US$2.8 million
in military assistance contrasting the period 1958-65 in which
Indonesia received US$1.2 billion in military aid from Soviet
and Soviet-bloc countries. (Dupuy, 1993, vol. 3, p. 1250)
During the period 1970-89, U.S. aid, including Export-Import
Bank arrangements, totaled US$4.4 billion with aid from other
Western countries totaling US$25.9 billion during the same
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period. Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
and Communist countries' contributions totaled US$213 million
and US$175 million respectively during the same period.
(Central Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook, 1995, p.
200)
The diversity of Indonesia's military inventory suggests
the flexibility with which they are able to deal with military
suppliers. The United Kingdom and France provided light tanks
and reconnaissance vehicles, as did the former Soviet Union.
The United States has supplied antitank recoilless rifles and
U.S. aircraft conduct all army and air force missions.
Additionally, the Indonesian navy has possession of German
designed and manufactured submarines, though their operability
is highly suspect. (Dupuy, 1993, vol. 3, p. 1250)
4. Defense Industry and Military Structure
The defense industry in Indonesia is small. What
manufacturing there is falls under the control of the military
and is centered on the manufacture of ammunition, uniforms and
field gear, ancillary eguipment, unsophisticated repair parts,
and small arms. A .30-caliber rifle is made locally in its
entirety. As a consequence, nearly all major military end-
items have been procured from foreign sources.
Since the mid-1960s, the United States has had the most
significant influence on military thinking in Indonesia. The
United States is not only a supplier of equipment. It is also
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a major source of military schooling for most of Indonesia's
officers. It is because of the extensive influence of the
United States on the Indonesian military that one will find
numerous similarities between TNI organization, doctrine, and
tactics and those of the U.S. military.
Indonesia's armed forces defense structure is influenced
by a doctrine that focuses on guerrilla warfare and gives due
consideration to the geography of this vast island nation.
Indonesian military units are small in size, lightly armed and
mobile. Therefore, detecting and engaging Indonesian ground
forces would be very difficult. These mobile units could
inflict severe damage on passing ships with the artillery at
their disposal.
In the 1960s, the armed forces were reorganized to
provide a centralized command structure which provided the
army with much greater influence than the navy or air force.
This organization was implemented to support the necessary
battlefield functions of intelligence, operations, personnel,
logistics, territorial affairs, and communications; the
departmental functions of manpower, material, finance,
education, legal affairs, and security; and nonmilitary
affairs such as sociopolitical development, civic mission, and
finally functional groups that distinguish the military as a




Indonesia has maintained a consistently non-aligned
military force structure. However, they have entered into a
number of financial aid agreements with the United States and
other supportive countries. Indonesia did provide a small
number of troops to the UN peacekeeping forces in Vietnam in
the 1970s and again in the early 1990s in support of the
Persian Gulf war. Membership in the United Nations was
established on 28 September 1950 and they are also a member of
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) , Asia
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) , OPEC, the Association of
Tin Producing Countries, and a number of other international,
socioeconomic-related. organizations. (Central Intelligence
Agency, The World Factbook, 1995, p. 200)
6. National Security Concerns
Indonesia' s national security concerns center on internal
stability issues relating to several revolutionary movements.
The Free Papua Movement (OPM) of Irian Jaya, consisting of
about 600 members of which about 100 are armed, is one threat.
The Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor, with
about 400 members, is also a threat to internal stability.
The East Timor problem is an ongoing international dispute
between Indonesia and Portugal. The United Nations has not
officially recognized East Timor as a part of Indonesia.
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Coupled with its enviable position as a major supplier of
oil to Japan and its strategic position astride Indo-Pacific
sea lanes, Indonesia possesses a significant global status
since it has the potential to block passage of petroleum and
gas products to Japan and other energy-dependent states.
The current monetary crisis involving Southeast Asia has
hit Indonesia particularly hard. As a result of deregulation
in the early 1980s, the banking sector experienced frenzied
growth. The number of banks increased sharply from 111 in
1988 to 240 in 1994. Reckless lending practices by a large
number of these banks has resulted in significant amounts of
bad debts. The banking sectors' credibility has also been
adversely affected by a series of private loan scandals and
frauds crises. In the wake of these troubles, Bank Indonesia,
their central bank, has tightened controls and introduced new
prudential guidelines for the banking activity. In response
to Bank Indonesia's desire for consolidation among the banks,
a few have been looking at potential mergers or acquisitions.
Others have secured joint ventures with foreign banks to help
restore stability. When economic stability and growth serve
so well to quell ethnic and income disparity tensions,
Indonesian government officials become concerned over
potentially volatile issues as financial crises. (Warner,




The littoral states' history illustrates the turbulent
beginnings each had to endure in the pursuit of independence.
Once independence had been obtained, the littoral states were,
and continue to be, reluctant to engage in alliances that
would limit or otherwise inhibit their ability to respond to
any perceived threat to their national interests in any manner
deemed necessary. While each of the littoral states has, at
one time or another, accepted economic and military assistance
from foreign sources, there have been no reciprocating
agreements that would have interfered with the littoral
states' ability to protect their national interests directly
and promptly. Though none of the littoral states have a
defense industry of any significance to their own defense,
their military structure is organized such that they would be
able to respond promptly to any perceived threat to national
security. Each of the littoral states have national security
concerns that are affected by the Malacca Straits. As such,
these tenacious countries might not hesitate to exert the
force necessary to defend themselves and protect their
national interests.
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III. FORCE COMPOSITION, CAPABILITIES AND ASSESSMENTS
After years of concentrating on internal insurgencies or
threats, the littoral states have in the past decade become
more aware of the potential regional threats surrounding them
and have taken the necessary steps to defend their waters and
airspace. Patrick Cronin, an Asian arms expert at the
National Defense University in Washington noted, "Even though
they (Southeast Asian arsenals) are modest, they do change the
character of what can happen in the tight airspaces and choke
points of Southeast Asia." (Engardio, 1996, p. 56) Most
analysts state, however, that the recent dash for military
hardware is less an arms race than the result of bigger
defense acquisition budgets and evolving strategies which are
linked to a new emphasis on external security to protect
commerce and resources.
At first glance, the force composition of Malaysia,
Singapore, and Indonesia appears less than daunting. Their
combination of small patrol craft, outdated frigates, and an
air force comprised of mostly Vietnam-era aircraft could
hardly be expected to muster up enough force to seize control
of an international waterway, much less deal a significant
blow to a major military power such as the United States. The
littoral states have masterfully amassed militaries that are
not only well-equipped for coastal defense and putting down
v insurrections, but are also capable of projecting power at
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some distance from their shores. Tables 1, 4, and 7 are a
partial list of the navy, army, and air force assets that
would likely be employed in any attempt to control the use of
the' Malacca Straits.
Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia collectively possess
quite a large number of Exocet and Harpoon anti-ship missiles.
These weapons are very accurate and relatively inexpensive,
especially when compared to an Aegis Cruiser. They also
collectively possess a significant number of frigates,
corvettes, and patrol craft to launch these weapons. While
these are far from being comparable to an Aegis Cruiser, they
are fast, inexpensive, and capable of inflicting heavy
casualties on naval and merchant vessels. The air space
around the littoral states is certainly not a weak link in the
defense of their interests. Malaysia has a squadron of
Starburst surface-to-air missiles (SAM) and Indonesia has four
battalions of Rapier SAMs . Singapore has, by far, the most
complex air defense system. Their holdings include an Air
Defense Brigade consisting of one squadron of 35mm Oerlikon
rapid-fire anti-aircraft guns and one squadron of Blind-fire
Rapier SAMs. Additionally, there is an Air Force Systems
Brigade consisting of one squadron of mobile RADAR, one
squadron of Mistral SAMs, and three squadrons of RBS 70 SAMs.
In addition to land-based air defenses, the littoral
states have equipped themselves with some state-of-the-art
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combat aircraft as well. Together, they own several MiG-29s,
FA-18s, F-16s, E-2C Hawkeyes, and Boeing 737-200s equipped to
function in a similar manner as the Hawkeye
.
In Tables 2, 5, and 8 the military expenditures for the
littoral states are shown. A review of these tables indicates
the determination with which the littoral states have pursued
the development and modernization of the armed forces. In
1996, Singapore budgeted over US$4-billion for defense
spending and acquisition for fiscal year 1997. While Malaysia
and Indonesia had budgeted less than that, their shopping
list, when combined with Singapore's, is cause for concern:
dozens of MiG-29s, F-16s, and attack helicopters and armored
combat vehicles, tens of thousands of missiles and launchers.
Also, it is estimated that within the next decade, twenty
submarines will be added to the Southeast Asian arsenal.
"Such naval power could give the ASEAN countries the option to
block important shipping lanes." (Engardio, 1997, p. 57)
Tables 3, 6, and 9 illustrate the value of arms transfers.
Though the figures do not suggest a linear increase in arms
imports and exports over the period covered, they do reflect





































a 8 Aerospatiale MM 40 Exocet SSM, 16 British Aerospace VLS
Seawolf SAM, 6 Whitehead Anti-submarine Torpedoes.
b 6 OTO Melara/Matra Otomat Teseo SSM, 4 Selenia/Elsag
Alobatros SAM.
c 1 Creusot-Loire 100mm Rapid-fire Anti-surface/Anti-air
gun.
d Will be fitted with SSM and SAM.
4 Aerospatiale MM 40 Exocet SSM, 1 Bofors 57mm gun, 1
Bofors 40mm Rapid-fire Anti-surface/Anti-air gun.
f 1 Bofors 57mm gun, 1 Bofors 40mm Rapid-fire Anti-
surface/Anti-air gun.
CJ 2 Bofors 40mm Rapid-fire Anti-surface/Anti-air guns.
h 1 Bofors 40mm Rapid-fire Anti-surface/Anti-air gun.
1 2 Bofors 40mm Rapid-fire Anti-surface/Anti-air guns.




Personnel 90,000 (reducing to 80,000)
Reserves 33, 000
Artillery Type Range
105mm M102 Howitzer 8 nm
105mm Model 56 P Howitzer 6 nm
155mm FH-70 17 nm
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1994 330 330 50 50
After Ref.








Fleet Type Active Building
(Planned;
Submarines'" 1 (2)
Missile Corvettes b 6 (8) c
Offshore Patrol Vessels d 5 7
Fast Attack Craft-Missile e 6
Fast Attack Craft-Gun f 3




Diving Support Ship 1
Police Coast Guard 69+ (20)
Notes
a 4-21 inch tubes, anti-surface wire-guided torpedoes.
b 8 McDonnell Douglas Harpoon SSM, 2 Octuple IAI/Rafael
Barak I SAM.
c Will be fitted with SSM (Harpoon) and SAM-VLS (Barak)
.
d 4 to 6 Gabriel II SSM, 4 Mistral SAM, 1 OTO Melara 76mm
super-rapid-fire (120 rds/min) gun.
e 4 McDonnell Douglas Harpoon SSM, 4 Gabriel II SSM, 1
Mistral SAM, 1 Bofors 57mm (200 rds/min) gun.
f
1 Bofors 40mm (300 rds/min) gun.
g 1 Bofors 40mm (300 rds/min) gun.







105mm LG1 Light Gun
155mm M68 GH (R)
155mm M71 GH(R)















































































\ W rH CTi CM CO CT r> CT ^r
w w o\°




rH CM CM rH CM CM CM CM
\ a, CTl LO CM CO O CO CT r~- LO
U S o\°
s u LO LO LO LO LO ^r «vT LO ^r ^r
co
4-J cu
d SH ^ -t
,—1 0) ^J -—-
—i a. W
rd g 4-J W ^ M O O CTi i—
1
u d •H CD a jj rH ^ ^T rH CO LO CT r-t KO
4-) ^ dUcS CM CTl CO CO CM CT CM cd CO r-\
d CD t-< -— i~> CM CM CO CTi CT CM r-\ CM CO
CD > CD h c <— i—i rH rH ^—\ rH rH <—
1
u o dl -H u
O X E
rH O' O O O O O O
rd 4-Jc 1— LO rH r~- LO CO r- LO CD
d




























O OO CO O
o 3 <vT co LO CTi O ^r LO <nT CO CD
u u KQ r- O ^ O LO O LO rH CO




C CM CO CO «=T CO r- ^ O <sT
CD ID CO lO CO LO CO rH CD CT CD U>
>i Sh 1-1 in -t CTi CT CM CO CM CD CO CT O




•H T3 U c
-H d s sH CD H
s a
•—1 u
•H C cr O CO O CTi CO LO O •nT
X S 0) LO O r- CD rH LO CO r^- O VD
H Ll LO LO lo CO O CT =cr r~- CT O
u 1— 1— rH !—
1
CM rH CM CM CM CO
M LO KO r- CO CT rH CM CO ^
rd CO CO 00 CO CO CT CT CT CT (J)
CD CTl CTi CTi CTi CT o\ CT CT CT o\




























































1985 180 240 40 53
1986 320 416 60 78
1987 200 252 40 50
1988 380 461 50 61
1989 190 221 90 105
1990 230 256 30 33
1991 360 386 50 54
1992 180 188 30 31
1993 180 184 20 20
1994 270 270 20 20
After Ref.








Fleet Type Active Building
(Planned)
Patrol Submarines'" 2 (2)
Frigates 6 17 -
Corvettes 16 -
Fast Attack Craft-Missile d 4 -
Large Patrol Craft" 16 4





8 21-inch tubes, wire-guided torpedoes.
5 different classes of frigate contain one or more of the
following: 8 McDonnell Douglas Harpoon SSM, 4 Aerospatiale MM 3;
Exocet, 2 Short Brothers Seacat quad launchers SAM, 6 Honeywell
Mk 46 ASW Torpedoes, 1 Bofors 120mm Anti-air/Anti-surface gun.
c 8 SA-N-5 SAM, 2 57mm twin guns.
d 4 Aerospatiale MM 38 Exocet SSM, 1 Bofors 57mm gun, 1
Bofors 40mm gun.
1 Bofors 40mm gun
r 1 Bofors 40mm gun





Reserves 17 , 000
Artillery Type Range
76mm M48 Mountain Gun 8,750m
105mm Light Gun Mk II 18,500m
105mm Model 56 P Howitzer 10,575m
105mm Mk 61 SPG 17,000m
105mm M101 Howitzer 11,270m
122mm M1938 Howitzer 11,800m
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1985 160 214 5 7
1986 160 208
1987 270 340
1988 260 316 5 6
1989 220 255 10 12
1990 290 323 5 6
1991 30 32 5 5
1992 50 52 20 21
1993 90 92 20 20
1994 40 40 10 10
After Ref.
'World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 1995'
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Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia have made significant
improvements to their armed forces. Each of the littoral
states has a navy that is more than adequate to protect their
fisheries and coasts and to control smuggling and piracy.
Although these navies are not on equal footing with a major
naval power like the United States, a large navy is not
necessary to control the Malacca Straits. The employment of
Harpoon and Exocet anti-ship missiles on fast, inexpensive,
unsophisticated patrol craft serves as a potent equalizer in
these narrow channels. The littoral states' air forces also
have been vastly improved, especially with the procurement of
Russian MiG-29s and U.S. F-16s. Though these high-performance
combat aircraft are few in number relative to the overall
totals of aircraft in their inventories, when added to the
quantity of less sophisticated aircraft such as the A- 4 and F-
5, the littoral states possess an imposing air attack
capability. Additionally, the employment of Harpoon and
Exocet ASMs on some of these aircraft serves as an effective
deterrent to surface forces. There is an advantage to be
gained in employing large numbers of less sophisticated
aircraft, especially when considering the short life
expectancy of combat aircraft confronted with modern air-to-
air or surface-to-air missiles.
Often overlooked by strategic planners is the capability
of long-range artillery. Each of the littoral state's army
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possesses a large quantity of long-range artillery, some with
ranges of up to twenty-two nautical miles. When placed along
the shores of the Malacca Straits, these weapons would create
a gauntlet that would be impossible to run. These guns are
great in number, easily hidden and highly mobile. Ships
transiting the Malacca Straits will, on numerous occasions,
pass well within the range of all of these long-range guns,
making a successful transit costly.
When combined, the littoral states possess nearly one
hundred naval vessels outfitted with ASMs, over three hundred
combat aircraft, some of which are capable of firing AAMs and
ASMs, and several hundred long-range artillery guns. Each of
these weapons has the individual ability to close the Malacca
Straits, for each one could sink vessels attempting a forced
passage and, because of the shallowness and narrowness of the
straits, prevent any further passage. Collectively, the
littoral states possess a quantity of military assets




IV. CATALYSTS FOR RESTRICTING THE MALACCA STRAITS
A. UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA III
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea III
has led to difficulties between the littoral states and the
rest of the world, especially the United States and Japan.
The convention was less than successful in resolving disputes
concerning accurate and all-encompassing definitions for such
terms as "territorial seas" and "innocent passage." This
created mutual animosity between littoral and non-littoral
states as each side attempted to interpret these issues to
their advantage. The littoral states maintain that it is
their sovereign right to control the use of the Malacca
Straits, citing Article 34 of the UNCLOS III. Article 34
states in part: "...passage through straits used for
international navigation established in this Part shall not in
other respects affect the legal status of the waters forming
such straits or the exercise by the States bordering the
straits of their sovereignty or jurisdiction over such waters
and their air space, bed and subsoil." (Simmonds, 1983, p.
B37) From the littoral states perspective, this article puts
the emphasis on controlling the straits firmly in their hands,
respecting the definition of Territorial Sea. Article 2
addresses the issue of territorial sea in this way:
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1. The sovereignty of a coastal State extends,
beyond its land territory and internal waters and,
in the case of an archipelagic State, its
archipelagic waters, to an adjacent belt of sea,
described as the territorial sea.
• 2. This sovereignty extends to the air space over
the territorial sea as well as to its bed and
subsoil. (Simmonds, 1983, p. B27)
Article 3 goes on to define the breadth of the territorial
sea: "Every State has the right to establish the breadth of
its territorial sea up to a limit not exceeding 12 nautical
miles, measured from baselines determined in accordance with
this Convention." (Simmonds, 1983, p. B27) Because of its
consistently narrow width, the majority of the Malacca Straits
lie within the territorial seas of Malaysia, Singapore, and
Indonesia, thereby creating the notion of ownership on the
part of the littoral states. Through ownership comes the
sovereign right to control the use of the straits, including
denial of passage.
The non-littoral states cite Article 19 - Meaning of
Innocent Passage, as their authority to use the Malacca
Straits. Article 19 states, in part, that "Passage is
innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the peace, good-
order or security of the coastal State." (Simmonds, 1983, p.
B31) Herein lies the argument of whether the littoral states
have the sovereign right to control the use of the Malacca
Straits to include denial of passage.
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The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS III) began in 1973, conducted its first major session
in Caracas in 1974 and concluded in 1982. In 1981 however,
the United States withdrew from the conference after the
Reagan Administration took office. The U.S. position was
aimed at the articles relating to deep sea mining. There was
an attempt to resolve the conflict by the conference members
but it failed. The conference concluded in 1982 and the
convention was presented. The United States did not accept
the convention, although the President publicly stated on 10
March 1983 that the articles covering traditional navigational
practice, including those that cover archipelagic states,
international straits, transit and innocent passage, and the
responsibilities of coastal states would be accepted.
O'Connell, 1982, pp. 24-28)
The interpretation of the definition of the terms
"territorial seas" and "innocent passage" are key points of
disagreement between the littoral states and the non-littoral
states. In spite of their concerns over the issue of deep sea
mining, the United States, particularly the U.S. Navy, had
every reason to come away from the UNCLOS III feeling very
satisfied. Several achievements of the Convention are relevant
to the navy: the twelve-mile territorial sea with a right of
innocent passage (Articles 3-16) ; transit passage in straits
(Articles 37-44); coastal state rights over living and non-
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living resources in the EEZ; freedom of navigation and
overflight for other states (Articles 55-75) ; coastal state
rights over the living and non-living resources of the
continental shelf (Articles 76-78); and the validation of the
concept of archipelagic seas, including the right of
archipelagic sea-lanes passage for others (Article 53)
.
(Booth, 1985, pp. 22, 23, 72) The Convention validated the
freedoms traditionally enjoyed by naval powers. However, one
noteworthy change to this tradition was the extension of the
territorial sea to twelve miles. Because this did not entail
the closing of international straits, this change proved to be
of little concern to those nations interested in the right of
passage in international straits, especially the United
States. The use of a twelve mile territorial sea had become
widely accepted prior to UNCLOS III and had not been seen as
* a serious interference with modern naval operations. The fact
that the Convention addressed it at UNCLOS III was simply a
compromise between traditional naval interests and
contemporary political and economic aspirations regarding the
sea. (Booth, 1985, p. 73) On this issue, the primary concern
of the naval powers was to maintain the maximum possible
freedom of navigation. This included innocent passage through
territorial waters, unimpeded transit through straits and
archipelagos, and high seas freedoms. The threat to these
goals was pressure from the coastal states which desired to
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exercise greater control over adjacent waters that are defined
by Article 3 as territorial seas. Some observers suggest the
Convention managed a satisfactory resolution of the tension
between requirements for naval mobility and coastal states'
pressures to increase their jurisdiction. (Booth, 1985, p. 73)
The prevailing attitude of the littoral states, however, seems
to contradict this observation. Article 19 - Meaning of
Innocent Passage, states:
1 . Passage is innocent so long as it is not
prejudicial to the peace, good order or security of
the coastal State. Such passage shall take place
in conformity with this Convention and with other
rules of international law.
2 . Passage of a foreign ship shall be considered
to be prejudicial to the peace, good order or
security of the coastal State if in the territorial
sea it engages in any of the following activities:
(a) any threat or use of force against the
sovereignty, territorial integrity or political
independence of the coastal State, or in any other
manner in violation of the principles of
international law embodied in the Charter of the
United Nations;
(b) any exercise or practice with weapons of any
kind;
(c) any act aimed at collecting information to the
prejudice of the defense or security of the coastal
State;
(d) any act of propaganda aimed at affecting the
defense or security of the coastal State;
(e) the launching, landing or taking on board of
any aircraft;
(f) the launching, landing or taking on board of
any military device;
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(g) the loading or unloading of any commodity,
currency or person contrary to the customs, fiscal,
immigration or sanitary laws and regulations of the
coastal State;
(h) any act of wilful and serious pollution
contrary to this Convention;
(i) any fishing activities;
(j) the carrying out of research or survey
activities;
(k) any act aimed at interfering with any systems
of communication or any other facilities or
installations of the coastal State;
(1) any other activity not having a direct bearing
on passage. (Simmonds, 1983, pp. B31-32)
The primary interest of the littoral states is paragraph 2.h
pertaining to pollution. Their position is that all shipping
traffic in the straits region produces quantities of pollution
sufficient to satisfy the conditions of this paragraph. They
argue that it is not only in their best interest to control
the type and volume of traffic in the straits region, it is
their sovereign right to do so. The Chief of Staff of the
Indonesian Navy reiterated his country' s stand on this issue,
one that has been taken since early 1970, by stating:
Every nation has the right to protect its
territorial waters from use by other countries
which could endanger the interest of its people, as
by causing water pollution and damaging off-shore
exploration and fishing industries. This will
surely happen if heavy ships above 200,000 tons
pass through the waterway (Malacca Straits) which
is shallow in several parts. (Asian Research
Bulletin, 1972, p. 1004 B)
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The Malaysian prime minister expressed similar sentiments by
stating:
Indonesia and Malaysia have the right to control
the Straits of Malacca so that it will not be
• polluted by oil spills from tankers which can and
will destroy the fish and the shores of both
countries. If this happens, the means of
livelihood of thousands of Malaysian and Indonesian
fishermen will be jeopardized. (Asian Research
Bulletin, 1972, p. 1004 B)
B. POLLUTION
The greatest threat to the economy and security of the
littoral states comes from the dangers of extensive pollution
stemming from the transit of supertankers or VLCCs (very large
crude carriers). (Johnston, 1978, p. 181) Pollution could
result from deballasting operations in which unused oil tanks
are filled with water to enhance stability and are then pumped
out, usually with a considerable amount of residual crude oil
included, to make room for a new load. A far more serious
source of pollution would result from a collision or grounding
of a VLCC, where vast guantities of crude oil would decimate
the surrounding fisheries and coastlines. It is this latter
example that has troubled the littoral states the most.
Concerns over a major oil spill in the .straits region
were realized on January 6, 1975 when the supertanker Showa
Maru, weighing 237,698 and owned by Taiheiyo Kaiun Co. Ltd.
Tokyo, ran aground just three miles from Singapore harbor. En
route to Japan from the Persian Gulf, the Showa Maru spilled
over 7,300 tons of crude oil, creating a six-mile long oil
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slick that threatened the island of Singapore, the west coast
of Malaysia and the fishing grounds of the Riauw Islands chain
in Indonesia. The significance of this accident went far
beyond the reach of the spill. It created a rush of
consultations among the three coastal states of the straits,
which promised a new level of consensus and solidarity that
neither UNCLOS III nor the then recent passage of the nuclear
powered USS ENTERPRISE were able to achieve. (Nakamura, 1978,
p. 14) This attitude of solidarity, pertaining to interests
in protecting and controlling the Malacca Straits, is still
strong today. With their economies so heavily tied to these
straits, the littoral states are more determined to exercise
their rights when regulating their use.
The Showa Maru incident was seen in Jakarta as a
confirmation of the government's worst fears. Long an
advocate of limiting the weight of VLCCs passing through the
Malacca Straits to 200,000 tons, Indonesia had been insistent
that the only safe route for these VLCCs of 200,000 tons and
over bound for Japan was through the Straits of Lombok and
Makassar. As the main user of the Malacca Straits, Japan
seemed eager to make concessions, particularly with regard to
the need to divert the passage of supertankers of over 200, 000
tons through the Straits of Lombok and Makassar. (Johnston,
1978, p. 182) Initially, Japan cooperated with Indonesia's
demands to use this alternate route beginning in October 1971
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and others followed suit. However, tanker owners objected to
this rerouting because it cost more time and money. The route
normally taken from the Persian Gulf to Japan runs through the
Malacca Straits and is 6, 606 miles long, whereas the route
through the Straits of Lombok and Makassar is 7,605 miles, a
difference of 999 miles. The time necessary for the
navigation of the route through the Malacca Straits normally
takes 17.4 days, while taking the route through the Straits of
Lombok and Makassar would reguire 20.1 days, a time
differential of 2.7 days. The resulting time demand would
cause the cost of each tanker to increase significantly,
causing a corresponding increase in the cost of oil in Japan.
In spite of this apparent negative net result, opting for the
longer route would allow for the possibility of increasing the
tonnage of each tanker due to the increased depth of these
straits, thereby reducing the overall transportation costs
significantly. (Johnston, 1978, pp. 182-183)
C. REGIONAL CONFLICTS
1. Conflicting South China Sea Territorial Claims
The Spratly Islands, located in the South China Sea, are
possibly the most dangerous area in Southeast Asia and pose a
serious threat to regional peace. China, Taiwan, Vietnam,
Brunei, Malaysia, and the Philippines have conflicting
territorial claims to the Spratlys. Potential oil and natural
gas deposits, rich fishing areas, and their position adjacent
to some of the most important sealanes of communication (SLOC)
contribute to the value of these small islands and atolls.
Additionally, several countries have established expanded
economic zones in recent years. Because some of the zones
overlap, territorial disputes are exacerbated. (Valencia,
1995, p. 14) As an illustration to the extent to which these
disputes have been elevated, China and Vietnam fought several
naval engagements in 1988 in and around the Spratlys, each
attempting to substantiate its claims through military force.
(Berry, 1997, p. 11)
In February 1992, China's National People's Congress
passed the Law on Territorial Waters and their Contiguous
Areas. This was, among other things, a declaration that the
Spratlys are a part of China's territorial sea and authorized
the use of armed force to settle conflicting claims. ASEAN
foreign ministers met in July of the same year for their
v annual meeting and issued their own ASEAN Declaration on the
South China Sea, which urged restraint on all the parties
involved in disputes. This declaration calls upon all
claimants to honor a pledge not to use force to settle
territorial disputes and to promote economic development of
the South China Sea while issues of sovereignty are
negotiated. Although the foreign ministers did not
specifically mention China, it was clearly evident that they
were concerned over the earlier Chinese legislation and
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China's threat to use force. (Simon, 1992, pp. 12-13)
In 1995 and 1996 the aforementioned concerns were greatly
increased when China directly challenged the Philippines on
and around Mischief Reef which both countries claim. Chinese
construction of what appeared to be a guard post and Chinese
soldiers manning it have been observed. Because Mischief Reef
is only 135 miles from the Philippine island of Palawan,
Philippine authorities strongly expressed their displeasure
for these actions and called on China to withdraw. (Holloway,
1995, pp. 22-23) Because the Philippine military is so weak,
China picked a good test case to determine what response to
expect from Mischief Reef claimants. In spite of the still
effective Mutual Defense Treaty with the United States, the
Philippine military weakness was a sobering realization for
their political and military authorities. Possibly, China
viewed this challenge to the Philippines as a means to probe
what the ASEAN and U.S. responses would be. China's
aggressive behavior in the Spratly Islands represented the
first direct territorial challenge to an ASEAN member.
(Valencia, 1995, p. 21) In spite of China's far-reaching
claims, the littoral states and other members of ASEAN are
loath to establish a unified military front for fear of
unnecessarily antagonizing Beijing. Lee Lai To, vice-chairman
of the Singapore Institute of International Affairs stated
that, "It is dangerous for us to talk of China as a threat, as
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such talk could become a self-fulfilling prophecy."
(Engardio, 1997, p. 56)
The well-established American position concerning
conflicting claims in the South China Sea is that disputes
should be settled peacefully without threat or the use of
military force. The United States does not maintain a stance
concerning the merits of the respective claimants, but is
willing to utilize its diplomatic resources to help resolve
any differences. (Berry, 1997, p. 12) Subsequent to the
development of the China-Philippine dispute over the Spratly
Islands, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International
Security Affairs Joseph Nye stated that if any conflict in the
South China Sea resulted in the interference of freedom of the
seas, then the United States Seventh Fleet was prepared to
provide escort service in order to protect that freedom of
navigation. (Holloway, 1995, p. 22) Although Nye did not
name China specifically, it was clear that his reference was
to the recent China-Philippines dispute and that he was
suggesting to the Chinese that they refrain from future
actions which could disrupt navigation through these critical
waterway. (Berry, 1997, p. 12)
2 . China and Taiwan
Another significant territorial dispute which could
affect Southeast Asia is the one between China and Taiwan.
This situation reached crisis proportions preceding Taiwan's
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first direct presidential election in March 1996. During the
weeks prior to this election, China made attempts to
intimidate Taiwan's government and citizens by conducting a
series of military maneuvers and exercises in close proximity
to Taiwan. (Kulkarni and Baum, 1996, pp. 18-21) Included in
these maneuvers and exercises were live artillery fire off the
southwest and northeast coasts of Taiwan, near heavy shipping
lanes, and the positioning of sizable military forces on the
Chinese mainland across from Taiwan. Chinese leadership had
apparently hoped these actions would assist in the defeat of
Taiwanese candidates who were espousing increased independence
for Taiwan in the international community. In December 1995,
it became evident that China's use of similar intimidation
tactics did little to influence the voting for Taiwan's
parliament. Ten million people, or 68% of the electorate,
turned out for the legislative elections. The results clearly
indicated that voters did not only fall into the categories of
"pro-China or anti-China." Rather, voters issued a mixed
verdict on the major political parties, firmly establishing a
three-party system. The dominant Kuomintang' s majority was
reduced, allowing the pro-independence Democratic Progressive
k Party to achieve modest gains. Voters also offered
encouragement to the neo-conservative New Party, which has a
softer stance on ties with China. (Baum, 1995, p. 14)
The U.S. position concerning China and Taiwan has been
the same since the 1972 Shanghai Communique. There is only
one China and Taiwan is part of China. However, the 1979
Taiwan Relations Act calls on China and Taiwan to settle their
differences by peaceful means and pledges U.S. support for
Taiwan's defense by providing military equipment to replace
obsolete systems. An example of this support came in the form
of U.S. influence both diplomatically and through the
deployment of aircraft carrier battle groups to the region
during the aforementioned crisis. Diplomatically, the United
States continued its policy practice of "strategic ambiguity"
in that American policy makers did not state specifically what
response the United States would take if China threatened
more direct action against Taiwan. (Berry, 1997, p. 14)
Nevertheless, this policy allowed the United States to serve
as an effective moderation force concerning both China and
Taiwan. Tensions have subsided moderately since the March
1996 election. The decision to deploy military forces in the
form of two aircraft carriers was also an important foreign-
policy tool that contributed to this outcome. If the United
States had not used its military assets, there is a
possibility that the most recent crises could have become
worse and may have resulted in conflict between China and
Taiwan. No other country has the capability to influence both
the Chinese government and Taiwanese Government the way the
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United States did. (Berry, 1997, p. 15)
3 . Superpower Vacuum
There are other potential sources of conflict in East and
Southeast Asia in addition to the Spratlys and the China-
Taiwan dispute. In a recent article in Foreign Affairs, Kent
Calder pointed out that several countries in the region are in
the process of becoming more dependent on Middle East oil
suppliers. (Calder, 1996, p. 55) Included in this list were
China, Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea. The greatest long-term
security threat to the region is a potential naval arms race
involving China, Japan, and possibly South Korea as these
countries attempt to protect their SLOCs . These SLOCs will
become even more important to their economic growth and
development with an increase in their dependence on Middle
East oil supplies increases. (Calder, 1996, 61-62) The U.S.
Seventh Fleet in particular serves as a stabilizing influence
in the region, reducing the possibility of such an arms race
since the United States position is clearly on supporting
freedom of navigation in the South China Sea and elsewhere.
(Berry, 1997, p. 15)
Similarly related to this stabilizing influence exercised
by the United States is the concern among several Asian states
that the United States might reduce this presence due to
domestic and other pressures. Should this happen, some fear
that a power vacuum would result whereby regional powers may
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try to fill the void. Asia does not have a collective
security relationship comparable to that of NATO (the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization) in Europe. As a result, the
United States provides a security presence, evidenced by
security treaties, agreements, and forward-deployed military
forces that was the cornerstone of Asian security in the post-
World War II era. Although the Cold War is over, real and
potential conflicts in the region still exist. A withdrawal
or further reduction in U.S. military forces is likely to
motivate China, Japan, or perhaps a unified Korea to fill the
vacuum that would result. (Calder, 1996, pp. 61-62) Concerns
expressed in the early 1950s by several Asian countries
pertaining to the possible Japanese threat are still valid.
The security relationship between the United States and Japan
remains an important tool in convincing the Japanese that
increased military expansion in the region is not only
unnecessary but would prove counterproductive to Japan'
s
larger foreign policy goals. This relationship has also
attenuated fear within the region concerning Japanese
intentions. (Berry, 1997, p. 16)
Many countries in East and Southeast Asia view the United
States as an "honest broker" and a valuable asset in providing
assurances that possible antagonists will not engage in
military aggression provided the American presence remains
viable. The continued presence of the U.S. Seventh Fleet and
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other forces are tangible evidence of the U.S. commitment to
remain engaged in the region. Widely accepted is the notion
that the absence of a United States presence will increase the
chances for conflict. (Berry, 1997, p. 17) Although some
Asian leaders are reluctant to express their public support
for the continuation of the U.S. military presence out of
concern that such comments might offend China, there is
widespread agreement that maintaining the status quo,
including U.S. forces, is in their best interests. Expressing
these sentiments in an interview after the 1996 China-Taiwan
dispute was Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord. He
stated that most Asian countries have expressed support for
the presence of U.S. military forces to limit the possibility
of the outbreak of hostilities. However, these countries made
these statements in private because they did not want to
encourage a confrontation with China. (Chanda, 1996, p. 17)
Each of the preceding illustrations of potential regional
conflict could have an overwhelming impact on all nations in
East and Southeast Asia. As nations engage in armed conflict,
the peripheral nations, who were not otherwise directly
involved in the original hostilities, could be drawn into the
fray. Of major importance to all nations in this region is
the maintenance of freedom of navigation through international
waters. The outbreak of hostilities may cause those not
involved to take the necessary military actions to secure
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their coasts and ensure safety of passage in international
waters
.
Particularly susceptible to the threat of armed conflict
and possible foreign occupation during a period of hostilities
are Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia. Considering their
geostrategic positions astride this critical passage, hostile
countries would certainly vie for control of this region.
Control of the Malacca Straits would ensure the continued flow
of necessary conflict-supporting supplies for those who
possess that control as well as denial of the same supplies
needed by those who are not in control. Clearly, any armed
conflict in the Asia/Pacific region will eventually have a
significant impact on the Straits littoral states.
Consequently, the littoral states are intent on increasing the
size and capability of their armed forces to protect their
interests in the region.
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V. CONCLUSION
For Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia, regional
instability is a major threat primarily because instability,
especially if complicated by limited regional hostility, would
seriously disrupt economic growth and development. Though
keenly aware of the sources of tension in the region, the
littoral states are reluctant to specify any one country as a
threat to regional stability. This is especially true in the
case of China. The idea of provoking a potentially self-
fulfilling prophecy is not favored by the littoral states.
The littoral states support the idea of concentrated efforts
on negotiation and regional dialogue through the ASEAN-ARF
process as the method of choice for resolving disputes in the
Asia/Pacific region.
For the United States, maintaining freedom of navigation
and keeping international sea lanes open has always been
important. When considering strategic interests in Southeast
Asian waters, the United States is interested in the
maintenance of open sea lanes between the Pacific and Indian
Oceans. Its national interests are best served by
unrestricted waters that promote free trade. The ability to
transit freely the Malacca Straits enhances the efficiency of
the U.S. Seventh Fleet. Closure of these straits would
increase the transit time between the Pacific and Indian
Oceans which could prove to be a critical factor in situations
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requiring expeditious movement of the fleet between the two
oceans. The United States is equally committed to maintaining
open sea lanes for maritime traffic in the Southeast Asia
region, especially for its East Asian allies whose economies
are growing more dependent on Middle East petroleum products.
The littoral states have been quite tolerant of United
States task forces transiting the straits in the past. In
spite of disagreements with the United States over certain
portions of UNCLOS III, especially those issues pertaining to
international straits and innocent passage, the littoral
states have never attempted to restrict the passage of United
States naval vessels. However, strategic planners should not
automatically assume that United States forces will be
permitted to use the straits in the event of regional
hostilities
.
The combined military assets of the littoral states are
sufficient to control the Malacca Straits. If, for reasons
perceived as contrary to their national interests and
security, the littoral states should proclaim the Malacca
Straits off-limits to certain or all shipping, these nations
would be well advised to accept this proclamation and enact
contingency plans for movement of their vessels through other
waterways. To be sure, no nation will accept this situation
without complaint. However, the costs of attempting to force
their way through the Malacca Straits would outweigh the
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benefits. Though initially the resulting delays in the
movement of raw materials, petroleum products and other
merchant goods would upset the economies and stability of the
region, it simply would not be worth engaging in armed
conflict to re-open the Malacca Straits. Utilizing an
alternate route through the Lombok and Makassar Straits would
increase the time and expense of shipments but these costs are
insignificant when compared to the costs associated with armed
conflict
.
Because Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia possess the
military capability to inflict significant casualties on those
who attempt to force passage through the Malacca Straits, the
affected nations will probably not be inclined to take these
risks and will transit other routes. The very real threat of
the use of military force to prevent the use of the Malacca
Straits by others will be sufficient to actually achieve
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